

# The Future of Behavioural Change: **Public or Private Nudging?**

Second AIM Brand Lecture  
by **Professor Alberto Alemanno**  
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**AIM is the European Brands Association.** It represents brand manufacturers in Europe on key issues which affect their ability to design, distribute and market their brands. AIM's membership groups some 1800 companies of all sizes through corporate members and national associations in 21 countries. AIM's mission is to create for brands an environment of fair and vigorous competition, fostering innovation and guaranteeing maximum value to consumers now and for generations to come.

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The AIM Brand Lecture series provide a new forum for the sharing of the latest insights from the world of brands and from thought leaders who interact with it. Brand manufacturers share EU policy makers' ambition to create sustainable and inclusive growth. The Brand Lectures hope to enrich the debate on Europe's future and how different actors in society can shape it together.

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**Hubert Weber**, President of Mondelez Europe and Member of the AIM Board, introduced the lecture and launched the new initiative AIM-NUDGE: "Mondelez is home to beloved and trusted brands like Milka, Cadbury, Toblerone, Côte D'Or, Oreo and LU biscuits. What brands can do for healthier and more sustainable lifestyles is not a new topic, but we're looking at it from a completely new angle through the revealing lens of behavioural insight. Brand owners have had to adapt to the evolving needs and preferences over generations of consumers. This is what we call "Consumer Insight" and it informs all our decisions in managing our greatest assets, our brands. However, what we see today is consumers saying that they want healthier choices or more sustainable products but they don't like the consequences of potentially different taste profile or price. We need therefore to focus more on implicit levers of behaviour which are observed and not just "declared" to truly amplify what we have already achieved in improving our products from an environmental, nutritional and ethical perspective. We can "do well by doing good" and identify opportunities where consumer satisfaction, public goals, profit-making and growth can coexist".



**Virginie Rozière**, Member of the European Parliament, Chair of the high level policy roundtable on Nudging, said as introductory remarks to the AIM Brand Lecture:

I would like to thank you for being here tonight and I would like to thank the participants of the roundtable for high level experts, stakeholders and policy officials from the European Commission and the European Parliament. This was a very stimulating discussion for lunch. We started with an assessment of the current situation we are in today. We have moved from, during the main part of the 20th century, an economy based on propriety and industry, towards an information society. It was an economy in which having access to information was key. But times are changing; we switched from this information society to an attention society. Considering that, it is not a surprise that nudge comes from the English speaking world. Indeed, in French we say “prêter attention” (lend attention), while in English you say “pay attention”, which means that they have seen very early that attention is now a resource, that companies have to deal with and to manage in order to reach the consumer. Now the consumer is overloaded with mass of information and the idea is not to provide information but to make sure that the information you want reaches the consumer. As policy makers, we are facing pretty much the same issue when we want to reach the citizen. We also have to make sure that our messages really reach them and so we have to manage to have them pay attention to us. So there is an objective of common interest in working on ways to manage consumer and citizen attention. But of course, starting from this point, many interesting questions arose during the discussion.

First, what are the right criteria to define nudge and to make nudge acceptable. The first thing that we agreed upon is that consumer choice and consumer freedom of choice is key, from a consumer but also from a citizen’s perspective. You have to make sure that choice is free. One of the people at the table said that if you are telling people that they have been nudged and they are not happy about it, it may mean that you are not nudging them but going a bit too far. I think this is something we have to bear in mind when we think about the way we want to design nudge

and the public interest/objective, but also tools and means to reach consumers and citizens.

Secondly, what arose was the need for transparency and trust. Is nudge compatible with a transparent way to explain what it is, how it works, which objectives it wants to achieve and which are the tools it uses? Because when you want to make consumers pay attention, it's not a matter of choosing the right information but to manage some more irrational, emotive, sensitive and sometimes intimate ways to make consumers act and react. So, of course, you have to be very careful and to be very respectful of this intimacy of consumers and citizens. About trust, most of you are representatives of companies and you know that more than ever consumer trust is very important to make sure that they will keep on consuming your products, choosing your brands. This also needs to be reflected in nudge. If you use nudge without building trust, then you risk that it strikes back against you and that consumers do not buy your products anymore.

Finally, the third issue on the table was the idea that together, consumers, businesses and policy makers, we agree on the idea that we want to develop nudge towards responsible consumption. Then, who defines what are the right objectives, what is the general interest and the common good that we want to collectively reach? In this respect, I think that what we are initiating tonight, and what should be continued, is to gather around the table of course representatives of industry and brands, but also consumer representatives and policy makers. So, I think that this is a really good start to try to define what is nudging and how we can achieve common objectives towards responsible consumption. We had very interesting insights from Mr. Alemanno that I am looking forward to hearing towards developing the idea: do we want to define nudging as acting on the architecture of choice, choosing one product over the other, or do we want to act on the behaviours in consumption? I think that this is one of the main issues that will hear during the lecture. Thanks for being here tonight and I am looking forward to hearing what's coming next.

Thank you.



**Monique Goyens**, Director General of BEUC, the European Consumer Organisation, provided the consumer perspective: “Behavioural science helps us to understand how consumers really behave, even if this shakes traditional economic theories: we need to work with consumers like they are and not as the rational creatures that economic theory would like them to be. Nudging is a useful tool to improve consumer policy making by looking at how psychological factors, bias and information influence consumer decisions. BEUC welcomes the AIM-NUDGE initiative and the branded goods industry commitment to nudge consumers towards healthy and sustainable choices and therefore gladly accepted to be a member of the AIM-NUDGE Advisory Committee. In this context, BEUC would like to “nudge the nudgers” and call on AIM to promote consistent approaches: if one wishes to help consumers to make informed choices based on their cognitive biases, e.g. in the food sector, one very useful tool is colour-coded labelling, better understood by consumers than reference intakes. The food industry would be well-inspired to adopt these schemes to better stick to consumer information needs. One important question is also that of who decides into what direction consumers should be nudged. Therefore it is important that objectives are transparent and involve third parties. Finally, nudging consumers to achieve public interest objectives can be one tool, but is not necessarily sufficient. Nudging outcomes must be assessed, and if not sufficient, need to be combined with more stringent public regulations”.

# The Future of Behavioural Change: Balancing Public Nudging vs Private Nudging

AIM's Brand Lecture  
by Professor Aberto Alemanno 6 May 2015

## Message

Nudging for good by the corporate world is not only needed but also possible, provided it is genuinely well circumscribed.

## Setting the scene

I am delighted to share a few initial thoughts about behavioural change and the role – if any – that the industry may play in it. The question that I will address is when – and under which conditions – private actors can actually nudge for good. While this is the terminology employed by the AIM-Nudge initiative, I will be referring to this phenomenon as benign

corporate nudging. Before doing so, I will contextualize this new, emerging phenomenon within the broader nudge debate. I will illustrate how this was born, how it developed and how it evolved, predominantly across the Atlantic. Understanding the political economy of nudging is essential to assess its global appeal among not only public authorities but also the private sector. In particular, I will offer a taxonomy of the different forms of interventions - generally depicted as nudging - so as to define the use of behavioural insights in both policy making and corporate action.

“When - and under which conditions – private actors can actually nudge for good?”

Life is about choice. What we eat, what we read, who we vote for, what to buy, where to live. Our ability to make choices is fundamental to our sense of ourselves as human beings.

Although we cannot always choose in life, when we do so we generally consider ourselves good choosers. We tend to pause, think, and ponder over the costs and benefits of different options before actually choosing.

Yet our ability to make choices in life that go to our best interests is increasingly questioned today by the rapid



emergence and wide-spread knowledge of behavioural sciences – such as psychology and behavioural economics.

Let me share a few illustrations of the major behavioural insights. You go to the doctor for a health-check. He tells you that you need to go through surgery. Before providing consent, you immediately ask what are your probabilities of success. The doctor knows the answer and he can convey it to you in either of these two formulas: (a) 90% of patients are fine or (b) 10% face complications. If he employs formula (a) 70% of patients will accept the intervention, but if (b) only 35% will.


Do you start doubting your ability to make good choices in life that go to your best interests? How free are we when we actually choose?

What comes into play in this illustration is called ‘framing effect’, i.e. the environment of choice influences our decisions in life. In other words, context matters. And it does so all the time. It does when you’re negotiating a mortgage, going shopping or engaging in a social media. Thus, for instance, rearranging the display of food makes it more likely that the healthy option is

chosen. Publishing an image next to your last posts on Facebook or Twitter enhances the likelihood that it will be read and liked.

But I have more (behavioural) insights for you. ‘Opt-out’ mechanisms for deeming consent for automatic registration processes (e.g. organ donation, pension schemes) increases considerably the number of users registered in a certain programme. As a result, an increasing number of countries are switching from opt-in systems, in which only citizens who took action are organ donors, to opt-out systems, in which all citizens are organ donors unless they expressly opt out. This suggests that defaults – the initial situation – matter. Another finding – which we have all experienced in life – is social pressure. That’s our natural tendency to adjust to the dominant behaviour of a group. Social context matters too.

These insights – framing, the power of inertia and defaults as well as social pressure – are often defined as mental shortcuts (or more specifically cognitive biases). Due to our cognitive laziness, we continuously and unconsciously rely on these mental shortcuts when making decisions.



Similarly to Homer Simpson, we think much less than we think we think.

This is potentially a disrupting discovery for all of us. And – as is often the case in life - this discovery, be it the power doctors have when interacting with patients or that of urban designers in drawing a default, can be used for good or for bad. While it can be used to increase the number of organ donations, it can also be used to make you stick to a magazine subscription - even though you no longer read it - through automatic renewal, i.e. a de facto opt-out scheme.

You won't be surprised to hear that marketers – as epitomized in the US series *Madman* – have been exploiting mental shortcuts for some time. They do so by steering our choices towards their best financial interests. Thus they make us engage in behaviour we would have never adopted, such as choosing and consuming products or services, without their input. Sometimes they trap us into buying items we don't need, or in opting for more expensive options. In short, they help us choose what they want us to buy. I call this private, or corporate, nudging.

And here comes the realization: if the market exploits our weaknesses so blatantly in pursuance of corporate objectives, isn't about time to expect public authorities to do the same to attain pro-social aims?

### Public nudging

Public authorities are indeed increasingly interested in exploiting behavioural insights through public action. They increasingly do so through choice architecture, i.e. the alteration of the environment of choice surrounding a particular decision-making context. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between two situations. The first is that

of a public authority which seeks to steer behaviour in the public interest, taking into account one or more mental shortcuts. Thus, a default enrolment for organ donation leverages -the power of inertia to enhance the overall prevalence of organ donors. Placing an emoticon (sad face) or information about average consumption on a prohibitive energy bill has the potential to nudge consumers towards less energy consumption. I call this pure public nudging. The second perspective is when public authorities react to exploitative uses of mental shortcuts by market forces by regulating private nudging. I call this 'counter-nudging'. Pure public nudging helps people to correct mental shortcuts so as to achieve legitimate objectives (e.g. increased availability of organs, environmental protection, etc.), regardless of their exploitative use by market forces. The perspective is somewhat different when public authorities counter-nudge. Here the architecture of choice has originally been engineered to serve corporate interests and public authorities step in to regulate the corporate activity of context-shaping. A case in point is the EU legislation prohibiting pre-ticked boxes in consumer contracts<sup>1</sup>. As a

result, if the retailer offers the consumer additional extras – for example, purchasing insurance with a flight ticket – those cannot already be pre-selected on the page. The consumer must positively opt in – by ticking the box – in order to select the relevant products. The counter-nudge consists of avoiding a form of exploitation of inertia bias.

Now that we have mastered the concepts of public and private nudging, respectively, the time has come to address the question central to this essay.

**“If public authorities nudge for good, can’t we also imagine private companies doing the same?”**

1. See Article 22 (Additional Payments) of Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L304 p. 64 (2011).

## Private nudging for good

Are corporations well-placed to nudge their customers towards societal objectives, such as the protection of the environment or the promotion of public health? This is what I call benign corporate nudging.

Well, their record is far from being the most credible. Companies have used behavioural-inspired interventions to maximize profits, which led them to sell more and in turn to induce citizens into more consumption. Yet corporate marketing need not always be self-interested. An incipient number of companies are using their brands, generally through their packaging and marketing efforts, to 'nudge for good'.

Let me give you a few illustrations:



### 'Smarties Portion Control'

Nestlé Canada revamped the packaging of Smarties products to make it easier for consumers to parcel out the candies into healthier portion sizes. The idea is to compartmentalize the consumption of Smarties in order to raise awareness - through a portion control system - of what you are actually eating. Nothing has changed in terms of properties of the products. The nudge merely consists of a design modification of the pack. As said by its proponent, 'It's a physical disruption to your eating pattern, just to make you think before you overdo it'.



### 'Turn to 30 degrees'

Another example is the 'Turn to 30°' campaign by Ariel. The idea behind it is to induce the use of a particular Ariel detergent with hot water at 30 degrees, which is significantly lower than the current habit of most consumers in the world. This led the company to come up with a product that gives good results at 30 degrees. According to the manufacturer, the campaign contributed to an increase in the number of loads washed at 30 degrees. As such, Ariel's 'Turn to 30' educated consumers to save energy and helped to cut 58,000 tonnes of CO2 emissions.



### Disposal of chewing gum

Another example relates to the disposal of chewing gum. Here the manufacturer tries to raise the awareness of consumers of chewing gum that they might dispose of it themselves. It offers a special box containing a storage space (for used gum) at its bottom.

So, what is private nudging for good?

Let's start from the above examples and identify what they have in common before providing a working definition of 'private nudge for good'.

The first common feature is that they all entail a corporate intervention – new packaging, a new product, and a new container - that is set to enable the consumers to internalize the social costs caused by the relevant product. Yet an original cooperative dynamic lies behind the action prompted by the manufacturer and possibly sustained by the user. We have a company that wants to address a generic challenge (over-consumption and obesity, energy use and environmental protection), but in order to attain its aim it does not act on its own. It rather asks its customers to help it mitigate the social costs caused by their own products or services. Those might relate to the over-consumption of sugary candies or the use of large quantities of hot water when doing the laundry. By working together, companies and consumers might remove the negative side effects of a company's existing products and services by coordinating their actions at the moment of consumption. In so

doing, companies encourage - and consumers may adopt - healthier lifestyles or eco-friendly behaviours.

Yet it is only by the cooperation between the company and the customer that the declared objective can be achieved. In other words, neither of them is capable alone - in the conventional framework of consumption – to attain such an objective.

But there is more. What these illustrations have in common is that the private nudge is in the short run neutral to corporate interests. Not only is the corporate action not a marketing technique aimed at increasing sales, it is rather – by conveying a message of aware consumption - pursuing a pro-social objective.

There seems therefore to be both a social and economic case for benign corporate nudging. Unlike governments, companies can effortlessly work to promote virtuous behaviours, such as reducing packaging waste, promoting healthy lifestyles, and limiting energy consumption — to name just a few social change efforts. In other words:

“Corporations, with their powerful brands, expertise proficiency, and consumer behaviour studies, are often better equipped than anyone else to induce behavioural change.”

But – of course – the question is when – and under which circumstances – those efforts can be perceived as legitimate by genuinely contributing to the causes they pursue.

In other words, under which circumstance might private nudging actually deliver?

Similarly to what occurs to any Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) effort, corporate nudge raises two kneejerk reactions: one from critics who believe that corporate nudging in any form is bad for society, and a second from corporate managers who look to nudging merely as an opportunity to maximize profits, by capturing higher willingness to pay.



“If we want to give private nudging a chance to succeed, it is imperative to make sure that this action won’t be dismissed as yet another attempt at capitalizing on consumers’ irrationality for corporate benefit”

So, we need to conceptualize the phenomenon of benign corporate nudging as clearly as possible by first contrasting it with conventional CSR efforts.

### Private Nudging vs CSR


Unlike conventional CSR, nudging for good does not pit business against society. In other words, it is not confrontational in nature. It rather calls upon and relies on **their active cooperation**: without the input of the individual, the declared joint objective (e.g. a more responsible consumption) won’t be attained.

Moreover, unlike conventional CSR, benign corporate nudging does not entail a reactive approach. Instead, it is proactive in nature: companies identify the social costs stemming from

consumption and shape the modalities of that consumption so as to mitigate those very same costs. This is so even when this cooperative mitigation strategy entails some economic losses in the short - and even medium - term for the relevant company.

As such, nudging for good may allow overcoming the hodgepodge of uncoordinated actions typical of CSR by focusing instead on few, consistent and well-targeted actions. This is true because benign corporate nudging does not focus exclusively on ‘generic social issues’, but it acts on social issues that are tied to the core business. And we know from CSR studies that the more closely tied a social issue is to the company’s business, the greater the opportunity for the company to make a difference.

In the Smarties examples, we have a company that is addressing at the same time: a generic challenge (obesity), a negative value chain social impact (over-consumption by some of its customers), as well as the competitive context surrounding its business (by creating a base of healthy customers over the long run).



That's exactly what benign private nudging should and could systematically aim at: creating a social dimension to the value proposition of a company.

By adding a social dimension (e.g. limited or at least 'aware consumption') to its value proposition, a company differentiates itself from others who cannot. It opts to operate for the long-term economic performance by avoiding short-term behaviour that is socially detrimental or environmentally unsustainable. And it does so in cooperation with consumers.

But there is more.

**"Benign corporate nudging may have – unlike CSR efforts – a positive long-term, habit-forming effect that influences consumers' future behaviour for good"**

Interestingly, this may occur even when consumers are no longer consuming the specific product from the very same company that originally 'nudged' them to behave in a certain way. Consumers eventually get used to purchasing smaller candy portions and eating less, thus becoming permanently more disciplined with regard to their diet and fitness. They can also get used to always laundering clothes in colder water, regardless of which detergent brand they use. Or – to stick to our illustrations - they could make a habit of regularly disposing of their waste, be that chewing gum or cigarette butts.

In other words,

**"the initiative of one company might act as game-changer for an entire industry because its actions are fundamentally of general applicability."**

This shows the potential for an 'education by nudging'.

This is entirely new.

To sum up, a well-run corporation that applies its vast resources, expertise, and management talent to problems that it understands - and in which it has a stake - can have a greater impact on social good than any other institution or philanthropic organization.

This brings us back to our original question.

### **When may companies nudge for good?**

To give this innovative approach a chance to succeed, it is imperative to define the conditions under which corporate nudging might actually be perceived as genuine and not as yet another conventional CSR exercise whose sole objective is brand reputation. We saw that 'nudging for good' carries the potential to overcome many of the flaws and limitations inherent to CSR efforts. One has therefore to leverage those features in order to circumscribe the limits of private nudging for good. But there is another reason pleading in favour of a clear delimitation of the boundaries of benign corporate nudging. Literature on consumer resistance teaches us that dissonant corporate efforts, such as upfront special treatment - require

companies to resort to legitimisation strategies in order not to be perceived as suspect and therefore generate mistrust. A nudge for good by entailing an action whose primary aim is not to maximize sales may indeed give rise to a dissonance in the mind of the consumer. This will be generated by the discrepancy between the consumer representation of an actor's action and its actual, unusual behaviour. This presents a further challenge to the emergence of nudging for good. This innovative form of corporate action does not only need to be credible and legitimate but also to be perceived - at the metacognitive level - as credible.

How to ensure that corporate action is not only legitimate but also perceived as such?

We previously identified the cooperative nature of benign corporate nudging as a sign of ontological distinction from CSR efforts. It is against this backdrop that we submit that only one specific form of architectural intervention may guarantee the benign nature of corporate action. Unlike conventional private nudge, a benign corporate nudge alters the architecture of

consumption, not that of choice. This is the hotel nudging you to re-use the towel by playing on defaults. This is Nestlé repackaging its Smarties (into smaller compartments) to limit impulsive eating. This is P&G encouraging you to wash (with Ariel) at 30 degrees Celsius to cut energy consumption. Conversely, it is not a hotel selling you a 'green package'. It is not a candy company reformulating its products, or a gym scheme whereby you pay only when you don't do exercise. The latter illustrations are attempts at capitalizing on behavioural insights by incorporating them into their business model. In sum:

**“a nudge for good should not aim at capturing willingness-to-pay by offering a competitive edge.”**

Thus developing a new line of products embedding a nudge into it ('by buying this product you will consume less of it') does not qualify as private nudge. This is conventional marketing. We should be clear: by allowing corporations to use benign nudges to maximize their profits through inter alia product differentiation we risk putting into question the entire enterprise.

My claim is therefore that nudging for good could only occur when it aims at altering the architecture of consumption, not that of choice. As soon as a corporation relies on behavioural insights to sell you a product or service, its nudging action no longer qualifies as benign. As it emerged from the literature on consumer resistance, even a full and immediate alignment between the corporate interest and the societal interest might raise the suspect of conventional private nudge, 'nudging for bad'.

To paraphrase the classic definition of a nudge:

**“a benign corporate nudge consists of any modification of the architecture of consumption aimed at altering people's behaviour so as to mitigate – in cooperation with the industry – the social costs of their action without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”**

In other words private nudges are not for sale. As soon as the companies do put them forward, by highlighting their nudging virtues, they cease to be nudges but qualify instead as marketing instruments.

This is not to rule out the benign nature of every corporate nudging that might alter the architecture of choice. Only to suggest that a nudging company, when altering the architecture of consumption, cannot highlight how that alteration changed its products or services. It can obviously communicate on that but – as clearly illustrated by the Smarties example – it can only do so as a secondary effect of its action ('new package' displayed on the pack). The focus of the action is – and must remain – on the consumption stage, not on that of choice. From a temporal perspective, the epiphany of the private nudge occurs at the moment of its consumption, when the product or service has already been bought. Only then. No better guarantee of the genuine nature of a private nudge exists than by confining it to the after sale.

But that's not enough. How can it be ensured that a corporate nudge for good won't backfire just because of the

source of the action? How to overcome the dissonance generated by the discrepancy between the consumer representation of a given company and the new typology of its action?

One possible antidote to consumer resistance at the metacognitive level might be offered by the co-creation of the nudge-type intervention. In other words, the cooperation that any benign corporate nudge should strive for should overcome a division of labour according to which the company is the nudger and the consumer is the nudgee. Rather the cooperation should enable the consumer to be part of the of construction site of the architecture of consumption. Thus, to stick to the Smarties example, one might imagine the consumer being allowed to determine how the portion control operates by letting him choose the exact modalities in which the new package will act on his consumption patterns. This might be attained by providing a set of options in the modalities of the opening of the pack. Possibly, this in-built co-creative mechanism will allow the consumer to share and perhaps own the nudge-type intervention with the manufacturer.



### Concluding remarks: circumscribing private nudge for good

As there is probably no more influential voice on today's supermarket shelves than business brands, companies and retailers are the best placed to signal to consumers virtuous behaviours.

By working together, companies and consumers might remove some of the negative side effects stemming from the (over-)consumption of a company's existing products and services. A benign private nudge operates as a key

enabler to such a process. By altering the architecture of consumption of a given product or service, it induces a lasting behavioural change in the population, which could in turn impact the business model of the whole industry. As a result, the benefits gained from the modification of the consumption pattern first go to the benefit of the individual consumers. Then they go to society as a whole and, eventually, they may go to the business interests who will benefit from a more durable customer base and sustainable environment.

Only circumscribing nudging for good to a set of well-defined actions could protect this emerging phenomenon from misperception and fear that it is cosmetic. To sum up, the company's actions must first be aimed at promoting a behavioural change at the moment of consumption, not that of sale. Secondly they must possibly prompt a cooperation with the consumers so as to facilitate co-creation and develop a sense of ownership.

Should these conditions be met, benign private nudge carries the potential to enable the corporate world to shift away from empty and cosmetic notions such as responsible consumption – which highlight personal responsibility – to a model of joint, shared responsibility between companies and society when it comes to consumption.

Therefore, companies need to recognize that nudging for good might be another way to build better relationships with consumers. If the issue in CSR is to align corporate interests with social responsibility agendas, the challenge for nudging for good is to align marketing efforts with genuine and immediate social action.

In particular, the cooperative and co-creative nature of private nudging as well as its non-marketing vocation are set to act as game-changers in the world of CSR.

To sum up,

**“companies that move beyond responsible marketing to nudging for social issues that are relevant to them may be practicing one of the most powerful forms of strategic corporate social responsibility.”**

Yet this means making a commitment whose strength is as strong, if not stronger, than the one companies make with profits.

The jury is still out.



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His latest books are *Nudge and the Law – A European Perspective* (Hart Publishing, 2015 – with Anne-Lise Sibony) and *Regulating Lifestyle Risks - Europe, Alcohol, Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets* (Cambridge University Press, 2015 - with Amandine Garde). He also published *Trade in Food – Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EU and the WTO* (Cameron May, 2007), *Governing Disasters – The Challenges of Emergency Risk Regulation* (Edward Elgar, 2011), *Better Business Regulation in a Risk Society* (Springer, 2013), *Foundations of European Food Law & Policy – The First Ten Years of the European Food Safety Authority* (Ashgate, 2013).

Originally from Italy, Alemanno is a graduate of the College of Europe and Harvard Law School. He holds a PhD in International Law and Economics from Bocconi University. Prior to entering academia fully time, he clerked at the Court of Justice of the European Union, worked as a Teaching Assistant at the College of Europe in Bruges and qualified as an attorney at law in New York.

For more information, you can check his blog at [www.albertoalemanno.eu](http://www.albertoalemanno.eu)



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